University of Chicago Law School

Chicago Unbound
Journal Articles

Faculty Scholarship

1999

Externalities in Open Economy Antitrust and Their Implications for
International Competition Policy Competition, Free Markets, and
the Law-Symposium on Law and Public Policy-1999
Alan O. Sykes

Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/journal_articles
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Alan O. Sykes, "Externalities in Open Economy Antitrust and Their Implications for International
Competition Policy Competition, Free Markets, and the Law-Symposium on Law and Public Policy-1999,"
23 Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 89 (1999).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Chicago Unbound. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Journal Articles by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more
information, please contact unbound@law.uchicago.edu.

EXTERNALITIES IN OPEN ECONOMY
ANTITRUST AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR
INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION POLICY
ALAN 0. SYKES*

Competition policy has become the subject of increasing
international attention, and members of the World Trade
Organization ("WTO") continue to wrangle over whether to
launch formal negotiations on competition policy under WTO
auspices. In this paper, I address the wisdom of such
negotiations and offer some preliminary thoughts about
possible approaches to an international agreement.
The theoretical case for international cooperation is a
powerful one and rests on the existence of substantial external
effects from national antitrust policies in an open economy-an
economy with international trade. It is difficult to imagine a
mechanism short of international cooperation that could
adequately address these important externalities, but ft is also
clear that international consensus on "optimal" antitrust policy
is lacking in many particulars. Accordingly, I argue for a
modest initial agreement aimed at encouraging all nations to
formulate policy with reference to global rather than national
welfare concerns where the two conflict. The legal principles
most pertinent to that task would include non-discrimination,
transparency, and due process requirements.
I. NATIONAL ANTITRUST PoLIcY WITH INTERNATIONAL TRADE

Every basic microeconomics course teaches the evils of
monopoly, using a diagram such as Figure I. The standard
exposition runs as follows.
* Frank & Bernice J.Greenberg Professor of Law, University of Chicago. This essay is a
revised version of oral remarks presented at the Federalist Society Eighteenth Annual
Student Symposium at The University of Chicago Law School on April 9-10,1999.
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Under conditions of competition, an industry will produce to
the point where the marginal cost curve (MC) intersects the
demand curve (D), for that is the point at which price just
covers the marginal cost of an additional unit of output. The
quantity produced is q' at price p', and "consumer surplus" is
measured by the area dcp'. With single-price monopoly,' by
contrast, the monopolist appreciates that all customers will
enjoy any reduction in price. Its "marginal revenue" from an
additional sale is thus less than the price received for that
particular sale because of the price reduction that other buyers
will enjoy. The monopolist will maximize profits by expanding
to the point where marginal revenue just equals the cost of the
marginal sales-to the point where MR intersects MC. At that
level of output, q", the market clearing price is p". Consumer
surplus is now dap", monopoly profit is p"abp', and total
surplus in the market is the sum of those two areas.
FIGURE 1
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1. Alternatively, the monopolist may have the capacity to price discriminate among
customers. With perfect price discrimination, price and output will be the same as
under competition. With imperfect price discrimination, monopoly will still reduce
output and raise price, though rather differently than described in the text.
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The loss of social welfare relative to competition is then

given by the "deadweight loss triangle" abc. This area
represents a loss of consumer surplus to individuals priced out
of the market by the monopolist. The further loss of consumer
surplus, p"abp', is not a social loss but is a "transfer" to the
monopolist who captures this amount as profit. If the
monopolist expends resources in pursuit of the monopoly,
however, it may dissipate some of its profit and the social
welfare loss will be greater than just area abc. In any event,
monopoly is demonstrably inferior to competition in this
framework from the standpoint of economic efficiency, and it is
on this basis that economists have long condemned it.
A moment's reflection will establish that this analysis of how
monopoly affects social welfare rests on the implicit
assumption that the welfare of the monopolist and the
consumers in the market "counts" equally, so that a dollar
transfer from consumers to the monopolist is a wash in the
welfare calculus. Put differently, the analysis presupposes that
"social welfare" is captured by the conventional measure of
economic efficiency and does not depend on distribution.
This implicit assumption is open to challenge. Scholars have
debated for years whether American antitrust policy should
pursue economic efficiency single-mindedly or should instead
pursue other goals that in some way take account of
distribution. 2 And a lively debate exists regarding the
intentions of Congress in enacting antitrust legislation. 3
For the most part, however, the parties to this debate
consider only antitrust policy in a closed economy, by which I
mean an economy in which all consumers and producers are
domestic citizens. Under such circumstances, one can plausibly
argue that the surplus of all citizens counts equally and that
aggregate efficiency should guide antitrust policy without
regard to distribution-especially if superior policy
2. For excerpts from this debate, see chapter one of MILTON HANDLER LT AL., TRADE
REGULATION (4th ed. 1997). The classic argument for an efficiency benchmark in
antitrust is that of ROBERT BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A PoLcY AT WAR WITH
ITSELF (2d ed. 1993). I offer a brief survey of the legislative history of American
antitrust in Alan Sykes, Antidumping and Antitrust: What Problems Does Each Address?,
1998 BROOKINGS TRADE F. 1.
3. See supra sources cited note 2.
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instruments exist to address distributional concerns.
But let us instead consider an open economy, in which goods
and services may be traded internationally and producers and
consumers may be of different nationalities. Does the efficiency
argument against monopoly still hold? The answer is, "it
depends," and it will turn on whose welfare "counts" in the
formulation of policy. If "global welfare" is the proper criterion
for implementing policy, then the analysis does not change at
all, for the net gains and losses globally are as described in the
discussion of Figure I. But if nations look to the welfare of their
own citizens primarily or exclusively-the "national welfare"
criterion-their view of monopoly may change dramatically.
For example, suppose that producers are foreign and that
consumers are domestic. Then, the national welfare loss from
monopoly is not simply the deadweight loss triangle abc-plus
any dissipation of monopoly profit by the monopolist in
securing the monopoly-but rather the full area p"acp'. From
the national perspective, monopoly is far more harmful when
the monopolist is a foreigner (as the United States discovered
during the heyday of OPEC). Alternatively, suppose that the
monopolist is domestic and the consumers are foreign. Then,
from the national perspective, the increase in profit to the
monopolist is a national gain, and the harm to consumers is of
no concern. 4
I will skirt the normative question of whose welfare "ought"
to count in the formulation of national policy and simply
observe that, from a positive perspective, it is exceptionally
unlikely that the welfare of foreign citizens will be weighted
equally with the welfare of domestic citizens in the domestic
political process. Foreign citizens do not vote in domestic
elections, they cannot be taxed, they generally do not donate
money to foreign politicians, and so on. Consequently, it will
certainly be the rare case in which their interests are taken into
account by domestic policymakers to the same degree as the
4. To be sure, the world may be more subtle-shareholders in the monopolist may
be of many nationalities, for example, so the physical location of the monopolist's
production facilities is not determinative of whose citizens earn the monopoly profit.

Moreover, the monopolist may sell to consumers both domestically and abroad. Such
observations, however, merely complicate matters without changing the basic point
that, from the national welfare perspective, the welfare effects of monopoly may differ
dramatically between the closed economy case and the open economy case.
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interests of domestic constituents. This claim is not mere
theoretical speculation, as we see innumerable manifestations
of it in practice. Indeed, examples can be found in the antitrust
statutes themselves. For instance, the Webb-Pomerene Act
creates an exemption from the Sherman Act for cartels that

operate exclusively in export markets.5
The implications of these observations are dear: not only will

national antitrust policies have significant external effects in an
open economy, but there is little reason to believe that national
policymakers, acting on their own, will give much systematic
weight to those external consequences in deciding how to
behave. Accordingly, national governments acting on their

own may tend to make decisions that promote the national
interest-or at least the interests of their well-organized

domestic constituents- at the expense of the global interest.
I have already offered the Webb-Pomerene Act's exemption
for export cartels as an illustration of this problem, but it is

important to recognize that it may surface in a variety of other,
and typically less transparent, policy decisions. For example, a

horizontal merger between two domestic companies that
export extensively might reduce global welfare because of its

tendency to produce higher prices, yet it may appear attractive
to the government because the injured consumers are largely
foreign. Similarly, if the same horizontal merger were efficient

from a global perspective of economies made possible by the
merger, foreign jurisdictions might nonetheless object to it

because their consumers bear any rise in prices and do not
realize any of the profits from cost savings in the merged

company. One can develop numerous other illustrations. 6

5. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-65 (1994).
6. See, e.g., Janusz A. Ordover & Alan 0. Sykes, The Antitrust Guidelines for
InternationalOperations:An Economic Critique,1988 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 4-1.
I wish to be dear that I am not claiming that national antitrust policy decisions are
in fact made systematically on the basis of careful national welfare calculations. Many
antitrust policies rest on no discernible welfare criterion, and indeed Janusz Ordover
and I have argued that the U.S. Antitrust Guidelines for International Operations in
particular cannot be understood with reference to either a global or a national welfare
criterion. See id. Likewise, the tendency of the Antitrust Division of the U.S.
Department of Justice to initiate cases against major exporters like IBM and Microsoft
suggests that leniency toward national champions with the capacity to earn monopoly
profits abroad is by no means systematic. Yet, there are enough examples of selfinterested national policies and decisions (such as the Webb-Pomerene Act, Federal
Trade Commission approval of the Boeing/McDonnell-Douglas merger, and the
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The potential benefits of international cooperation in the face
of this problem are obvious, and indeed one can conceptualize
the situation as a classic Prisoner's Dilemma. Nations acting on
their own will tend to pursue the national interest at the
expense of the global interest, but if they could cooperate and
credibly promise not to behave in that fashion, all nations
would benefit on average. Thus, we can make out a case, at
least in theory, for an international agreement committing its
signatories in some fashion to pursue global welfare rather
than national welfare.
II. WHAT LEGAL OBLIGATIONS ARE APPROPRIATE?

The task of structuring a useful international competition
policy agreement is not a trivial one. I do not imagine for an
instant that a treaty of the form "we promise to use global
welfare as a touchstone for policy" would accomplish much or
would be politically attractive to national officials. Rather, the
task is to fashion an agreement that would promote that
general objective, yet stand on much more precise and concrete
obligations.
I cannot in this short piece hope to elaborate all the details
and options for such an agreement,7 but I will suggest a few
particulars. A central principle should be the "national
treatment principle," which is simply a rule of nondiscrimination. Here, it would require that nations not
discriminate in their competition policy rules or enforcement
actions according to the nationality of producers or consumers
affected by them.
This principle has a number of immediate corollaries. For
example, the Webb-Pomerene exemption for export cartels
expressly discriminates in favor of cartels that burden foreign
consumers only and could not survive under the national
treatment principle. Likewise, a merger review policy that was
more lenient toward mergers of firms that export a great deal
would violate the national treatment obligation. A national
European Community challenge to it) to suggest that national policymakers do give
more weight to domestic interests than to foreign interests, and indeed it would be
surprising were it otherwise.
7. There is a large amount of literature on these issues. See, e.g., Eleanor Fox,
Competition Policy and the Millennium Round, 2 J. INT'L ECON. L. (forthcoming Dec. 1999).
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treatment obligation would also require nations to grant
private rights of action to foreign nationals injured by
anticompetitive conduct within the jurisdiction just as it does to
domestic nationals.
A substantive commitment to national treatment is worthless
unless deviations from that commitment can be detected.
Accordingly, a useful agreement must embody certain
"transparency" requirements, such as a requirement for the
publication of decisions accompanied by a statement of reasons
and a requirement that decisions be based on information in a
public record. Such requirements make it harder for nations to
violate their obligations without somehow signaling their
wrongdoing. Related "due process" requirements, such as a
requirement that all interested parties be given notice of
proceedings and an opportunity to be heard, are useful to
ensure that competition policy authorities and courts take
account of the effects of their decisions on foreign nationals.
Finally, a dispute resolution system is required to afford
some avenue for nations to enforce their rights under the
agreement. One can readily imagine such a system modeled on
that of the WTO, where international bodies of experts can
review national decisions for compliance with WTO
obligations.
Indeed, the WTO is probably the logical umbrella entity for
the agreement, in part because of a fairly well-functioning
dispute resolution system that is already in place. Further, by
locating the agreement within the WTO, an opportunity for
side payments arises that may sway nations otherwise
reluctant to sign the agreement. Some nations may be hesitant
to make commitments on competition policy because they may
benefit on balance from opportunities to pursue national
interests at the expense of global interests. Such nations can be
"bribed" within the WTO by giving them concessions on
market access issues involving trade in goods and services.
The framework outlined here, to be sure, will not resolve all
issues, and some must no doubt remain unresolved for the time
being. For example, there is no global consensus on the proper
antitrust treatment of vertical restraints or on tight criteria for
the treatment of horizontal mergers. Substantive differences in
policy on these and other subjects will persist, and are, of
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course, permitted under an agreement that merely requires
non-discrimination, transparency, and due process.
Is an agreement along the lines sketched here realistic as a
political matter? I do not know the answer to this question, and
I certainly do not want to suggest that the United States should
accede to whatever agreement might be put forward by others
regardless of its terms. I suggest only that significant gains
from cooperation on antitrust policy are possible in principle
and that simple commitments on non-discrimination,
transparency, and due process could realize some of them.
Formal competition policy negotiations under WTO auspices
would permit the trading community to determine whether
such commitments are attainable in the near term.
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